I'm not entirely clear on what you mean by "intrinsic value" here. You say that "Something is intrinsically valuable when it’s valuable in itself and desirable for its own sake." However, this seems like it could be interpreted in two ways:
(1) I value some things as means to my ends, but then I also have ends that I value for their own sake. I do not valuable these ends because I think my ends are valuable independent of me valuing them. It's simply that I value the ends non-instrumentaly. I think of these as non-isntrumental or terminal values.
(2) Some people think certain things are valuable in that they have some kind of property of "being valuable." It's not that they are terminal goals or values of some real or possible agent, but rather they are valuable regardless of whether anyone values them or not.
I don't know which (if either) sense of intrinsic value you have in mind.
Saved this post. This is a similar point that David Hershenov makes in "If abortion, then infanticide" regarding consciousness and abortion.
I'm not entirely clear on what you mean by "intrinsic value" here. You say that "Something is intrinsically valuable when it’s valuable in itself and desirable for its own sake." However, this seems like it could be interpreted in two ways:
(1) I value some things as means to my ends, but then I also have ends that I value for their own sake. I do not valuable these ends because I think my ends are valuable independent of me valuing them. It's simply that I value the ends non-instrumentaly. I think of these as non-isntrumental or terminal values.
(2) Some people think certain things are valuable in that they have some kind of property of "being valuable." It's not that they are terminal goals or values of some real or possible agent, but rather they are valuable regardless of whether anyone values them or not.
I don't know which (if either) sense of intrinsic value you have in mind.
Glad I stumbled on your writing, looking forward to reading more.