Commitment to mereological universalism and the unrestricted composition principle doesn't seem to offer the perfect being theist any reason to affirm that a maximally great collection of "Gods" exists. For polytheism to be true is for it to be the case that there is an x and a y such that (i) x is god (i.e., the predicate “god” applies to x), (ii) y is god (i.e., the predicate “god” applies to y), and (iii) x is not identical to y. In other words, there are at least two gods.
However, the predicate “god” does not apply to a maximally great being; rather, the predicate “God” applies to a maximally great being, and perfect being theists endorse the following account of what it is to be a God: x is a God iff (∃y)(y=God & x=y). This account entails that polytheism is logically impossible.
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• Trinity and Polytheism by Edward Wierenga
• The Problem With Social Trinitarianism: A Reply to Wierenga by J.E. Brower, see pg. 299
• Social Trinitarianism and Polytheism by Brandon Carey, see pg. 100-101
interesting article, i always make a following simple argument and i haven't got even mediocre reply so far. Maybe you can present some solid counter argument. "If many gods posses different qualities and personality traits, why couldn't those qualities be at once present in one person?"
"If you accept X (which is false) and Y (which is impressively false, almost scandalously so), then polytheism follows."
Commitment to mereological universalism and the unrestricted composition principle doesn't seem to offer the perfect being theist any reason to affirm that a maximally great collection of "Gods" exists. For polytheism to be true is for it to be the case that there is an x and a y such that (i) x is god (i.e., the predicate “god” applies to x), (ii) y is god (i.e., the predicate “god” applies to y), and (iii) x is not identical to y. In other words, there are at least two gods.
However, the predicate “god” does not apply to a maximally great being; rather, the predicate “God” applies to a maximally great being, and perfect being theists endorse the following account of what it is to be a God: x is a God iff (∃y)(y=God & x=y). This account entails that polytheism is logically impossible.
—
• Trinity and Polytheism by Edward Wierenga
• The Problem With Social Trinitarianism: A Reply to Wierenga by J.E. Brower, see pg. 299
• Social Trinitarianism and Polytheism by Brandon Carey, see pg. 100-101
interesting article, i always make a following simple argument and i haven't got even mediocre reply so far. Maybe you can present some solid counter argument. "If many gods posses different qualities and personality traits, why couldn't those qualities be at once present in one person?"
Thanks