"For example, Hadsell’s case relies on the claim that God couldn’t possibly have made you so that you didn’t need union with him to be satisfied. This is an eminently contestable assumption, and I think it probably isn’t true."
I wrote this paper a while ago, so I don't remember if I said this or not. And I may have also said something to this effect in our interview--I don't remember.
But I'll just speak for how I see things now: I don't believe this claim here. I just think that *if* God created us as we are (i.e., as creatures whose final ends are union with him), *then* divine duties follow in tow.
So, if God created us without this yearning, then yes, it wouldn't make sense to say that he's required to pursue union with us.
While controversial, this claim seems to follow pretty straightforwardly from
1) the traditional understanding that God, as the ultimate origin of reality, has many of the properties of the Tao or the Neoplatonist One, and it is fairly literal to say that God is the Truth
2) the fact that humans have the capacity for rational thought
If the highest fulfillment conceivable for a being's rational faculties is full communion with the Truth, then at least that kind of union with God is necessarily included in the highest end of any rational being.
If one thinks that all ethical norms basically reduce to practical norms (à la neo-Aristotelian naturalism), then the omniscience solution might actually work. Peter Geach says something like this in "The Moral Law and the Law of God": the reason to obey God is that he's your perfectly loving, all-knowing creator, so how could it possibly be rational to disobey him?
I think defenders of divine authority want to say that you’d have an *objective* obligation to do something God had told you to, even if there were no practical benefits attached to it (or even, if you think that complying with God’s commands is intrinsically beneficial, the harms of complying exactly cancelled out that prudential benefit.)
Right, but you might think (as do many Aristotelians and Thomists) that ethical norms fundamentally *reduce* to claims about what is conducive to flourishing. So they'll claim it just doesn't make any sense to say "you should obey God even if doing so doesn't conduce to your flourishing." The only reason why you should do ANYTHING is that it ultimately conduces to your flourishing!
The objectivity of the norm concerning obedience to God comes from the fact that it is impossible for disobedience to conduce to the flourishing of any rational creature (since friendship with God is the highest possible good). You might not believe that, of course, but it seems like somebody who accepts the required metaphysics could find here a perfectly good reason to think that all people should always obey God.
I think this is a plausible idea. It is worth noting, though, that Mark Murphy is one of the biggest proponents of there being a divine authority problem and he strikes me as a (sort of) natural lawyer.
I wonder if the theist really needs to believe in divine authority, especially since it runs into Euthyphro problem. If it's enough to take the Thomist approach that God created us with a given purpose and nature and that following His teaching is the best fulfilment of our purpose and nature.
I wonder how the case of becoming holy fits in with the fact that we are all sinners who fall short of the glory of God even in spite of our best efforts - that we need grace
"For example, Hadsell’s case relies on the claim that God couldn’t possibly have made you so that you didn’t need union with him to be satisfied. This is an eminently contestable assumption, and I think it probably isn’t true."
I wrote this paper a while ago, so I don't remember if I said this or not. And I may have also said something to this effect in our interview--I don't remember.
But I'll just speak for how I see things now: I don't believe this claim here. I just think that *if* God created us as we are (i.e., as creatures whose final ends are union with him), *then* divine duties follow in tow.
So, if God created us without this yearning, then yes, it wouldn't make sense to say that he's required to pursue union with us.
Ah, ok, I’ll edit it out 🫡
While controversial, this claim seems to follow pretty straightforwardly from
1) the traditional understanding that God, as the ultimate origin of reality, has many of the properties of the Tao or the Neoplatonist One, and it is fairly literal to say that God is the Truth
2) the fact that humans have the capacity for rational thought
If the highest fulfillment conceivable for a being's rational faculties is full communion with the Truth, then at least that kind of union with God is necessarily included in the highest end of any rational being.
If one thinks that all ethical norms basically reduce to practical norms (à la neo-Aristotelian naturalism), then the omniscience solution might actually work. Peter Geach says something like this in "The Moral Law and the Law of God": the reason to obey God is that he's your perfectly loving, all-knowing creator, so how could it possibly be rational to disobey him?
I think defenders of divine authority want to say that you’d have an *objective* obligation to do something God had told you to, even if there were no practical benefits attached to it (or even, if you think that complying with God’s commands is intrinsically beneficial, the harms of complying exactly cancelled out that prudential benefit.)
Right, but you might think (as do many Aristotelians and Thomists) that ethical norms fundamentally *reduce* to claims about what is conducive to flourishing. So they'll claim it just doesn't make any sense to say "you should obey God even if doing so doesn't conduce to your flourishing." The only reason why you should do ANYTHING is that it ultimately conduces to your flourishing!
The objectivity of the norm concerning obedience to God comes from the fact that it is impossible for disobedience to conduce to the flourishing of any rational creature (since friendship with God is the highest possible good). You might not believe that, of course, but it seems like somebody who accepts the required metaphysics could find here a perfectly good reason to think that all people should always obey God.
I think this is a plausible idea. It is worth noting, though, that Mark Murphy is one of the biggest proponents of there being a divine authority problem and he strikes me as a (sort of) natural lawyer.
I wonder if the theist really needs to believe in divine authority, especially since it runs into Euthyphro problem. If it's enough to take the Thomist approach that God created us with a given purpose and nature and that following His teaching is the best fulfilment of our purpose and nature.
I wonder how the case of becoming holy fits in with the fact that we are all sinners who fall short of the glory of God even in spite of our best efforts - that we need grace
Our sinfulness means that we need God in order to make us holy!