You did really well, m8. I'd be interested to hear more about whether you think theism theism plays any explanatory role at all in your view of non-natural moral realism.
E.g., some people think moral abstracta = divine ideas. Others just think God and morality are just totally separate.
I think theism plays no role in explaining moral facts.
My #1 worry about divine conceptualism is this: to make theism a simple hypothesis, you need some unifying explanation of why God has all the attributes and ideas he has. A plausible answer is “perfection”, or something in the neighbourhood. But since perfection is normative, there’s going to end up being a moral reason why God has the ideas he does (which isn’t itself an idea, unless you think this kind of explanation could be circular).
You should seek harmony with The Good! But why not God, too? Relationships are valuable, and a relationship with God would plausibly be a relationship of the most valuable kind. Also, a relationship with God would result in you getting infinite benefits in the afterlife.
I often find Nathan insulting and attacking Christian apologists as directly as possible, but whenever he sees a tweet or something from a Christian which he doesn’t like, he will immediately jump on his high horse and decry meager moral fruits and whatnot
My greatest objection would be of the anti-realist sort. One does not need to presuppose moral realism to grant that the notion of feeling appropriately guilty about, all we need is to appel to the normative convictions of people who experience guilt.
Wouldn't be it simple and reasonable to compare theism to naturalism without focusing on specific naturalistic hypothesis? After all, we can charitably admit that naturalism posseses adequate resources to eventually address the issue, we can derive that conclusion after looking at the successful explanatory history of it. Then, since the dispute is not empirical, we can proceed further.
You did really well, m8. I'd be interested to hear more about whether you think theism theism plays any explanatory role at all in your view of non-natural moral realism.
E.g., some people think moral abstracta = divine ideas. Others just think God and morality are just totally separate.
Thanks!
I think theism plays no role in explaining moral facts.
My #1 worry about divine conceptualism is this: to make theism a simple hypothesis, you need some unifying explanation of why God has all the attributes and ideas he has. A plausible answer is “perfection”, or something in the neighbourhood. But since perfection is normative, there’s going to end up being a moral reason why God has the ideas he does (which isn’t itself an idea, unless you think this kind of explanation could be circular).
(I think they’re totally separate)
This theory sounds sort of like
1. There is the Tao, the ultimate metaphysical ground of things like moral truth
2. There is a guy named God, who by virtue of being perfect, is perfectly in harmony with the Tao
Why care about God? Why not skip straight ahead to seeking harmony with the Tao, just like God does?
You should seek harmony with The Good! But why not God, too? Relationships are valuable, and a relationship with God would plausibly be a relationship of the most valuable kind. Also, a relationship with God would result in you getting infinite benefits in the afterlife.
Thanks for referring people to my blog!
Cool. We share the same metaethical view.
I often find Nathan insulting and attacking Christian apologists as directly as possible, but whenever he sees a tweet or something from a Christian which he doesn’t like, he will immediately jump on his high horse and decry meager moral fruits and whatnot
My greatest objection would be of the anti-realist sort. One does not need to presuppose moral realism to grant that the notion of feeling appropriately guilty about, all we need is to appel to the normative convictions of people who experience guilt.
Wouldn't be it simple and reasonable to compare theism to naturalism without focusing on specific naturalistic hypothesis? After all, we can charitably admit that naturalism posseses adequate resources to eventually address the issue, we can derive that conclusion after looking at the successful explanatory history of it. Then, since the dispute is not empirical, we can proceed further.