I quite enjoyed Dustin's repeated yeah...I mean, maybe's and I dunno's in the big debate with Ethan.
Also, as good as it was, I think the discussion ignored some middle way hypotheses about the miracles, like the initial visions being a genuine encounter with God (via the Blessed Virgin) and Lucia later getting high on her own supply to whatever degree and trying to keep things going with the secrets and embellished reports of what was said and so on.
I suppose this is a result of Ethan placing the bar as high as possible for himself, viz. the visions and sun miracle being a definitive, vindicatory proof of Catholicism rather than just a striking series of events that makes it more plausible than it might otherwise be. For what it's worth, the Church has never held to an all-or-nothing criterion for miracles and visions, and in fact can only declare them "worthy of belief" explicitly denying that they are binding on all believers. This comes in handy not only with Fatima but with things like the Medjugorge, the Divine Mercy devotion or even Joan of Arc (the trial is evidence enough that she was on to something but why would God favor France in the Hundred Years' War anyway?).
Oh, and I love that Dustin casually dropped "yeah, it definitely seems like Joseph of Cupertino and Teresa of Avila could levitate," halfway through.
I guess the replies will be: 1) if we’re adopt soul theory to get out of this problem for humans, then the door is open to saying that Als are/could be ensouled; 2) if we’re happy to paraphrase in the human case (‘the simples are arranged welfare-subject wise’), we should be happy to do it with AIs; 3) if we’re organicists or something and only accept mereological nihilism about some things, it’s not *super* obvious that no AIs will ever be sufficiently integrated to count as composite objects; 4) even if mereological nihilism is true, we should gamble a potential moral catastrophe on it
Seems ad hoc to introduce a soul without what souls are usually introduced to address (which is consciousness and subjects, whose existence is downstream of the cogito), isn’t the paper supposed to avoid making this move?. Am not an organicist, I think not being one is not crazy, a lot of expert metaphysicians are either universalists or nihilists. m fine with not gamble moral catastrophe I guess, I resist the move here as it usually functions though, introducing an epistemic probability as a lottery we should take, for this wacky schemes you can tell a plausible story on almost any vector of actions; plus false positive risk and all that. Like we could do this with dream people, game people, how certain are you that X is not morally relevant, oh not 0 therefore we should obviously take action Y when there’s other paths that are more robust
I think uAIw people can’t make use of souls, I think you’re a soul, in the sense that people like Dainton and Robert Howell think you are a soul-like thing
Presumably you think that NLT is such that even higher order evidence from some smart caths believing it or something does not imply going full “plan the whole future as to minimize lies to the cost of any arbitrary good”
Really struggling to see how something without any capacity for consciousness can have any sort of affective state (Mogensen says an affective state, like an emotion, is necessary for desire). He gives an example of unconscious or repressed anger, and analyzes this as a sort of disposition to have an occurrent experience of anger. This is supposed to motivate the view that consciousness is not required for emotion or other affective states. It's clear that a conscious being capable of having an occurrent emotion can have a disposition towards having that occurrent emotion. I don't understand how something without any capacity for consciousness can have a disposition towards having an occurrent experience of an emotion. To my ears, it's like saying a permanently stationary object that lacks the capacity to move can have a disposition to move. I don't have access to his paper so I'm just going by the interview.
Ooh, I'll have to read those papers about unconscious welfare subjects. I have considered the idea before, since I am a desire-satisfactionist, but I haven't gone too in-depth on it. The first time I heard of the idea that non-conscious beings could have moral status, I thought it was ridiculous, but that was at least in part because at the time I thought hedonism was the right account of welfare. I've since then still stuck with, "Only conscious beings have moral status," but I'm not if I should explain this by unconscious beings not really having desires, or their desires not mattering in the same way conscious beings' do, or if I'm actually wrong and they do have moral status.
Appreciate the glaze haha
I quite enjoyed Dustin's repeated yeah...I mean, maybe's and I dunno's in the big debate with Ethan.
Also, as good as it was, I think the discussion ignored some middle way hypotheses about the miracles, like the initial visions being a genuine encounter with God (via the Blessed Virgin) and Lucia later getting high on her own supply to whatever degree and trying to keep things going with the secrets and embellished reports of what was said and so on.
I suppose this is a result of Ethan placing the bar as high as possible for himself, viz. the visions and sun miracle being a definitive, vindicatory proof of Catholicism rather than just a striking series of events that makes it more plausible than it might otherwise be. For what it's worth, the Church has never held to an all-or-nothing criterion for miracles and visions, and in fact can only declare them "worthy of belief" explicitly denying that they are binding on all believers. This comes in handy not only with Fatima but with things like the Medjugorge, the Divine Mercy devotion or even Joan of Arc (the trial is evidence enough that she was on to something but why would God favor France in the Hundred Years' War anyway?).
Oh, and I love that Dustin casually dropped "yeah, it definitely seems like Joseph of Cupertino and Teresa of Avila could levitate," halfway through.
This was great, ty
On points 9 and 10 it seems that std mereological nihilism implies there’s no welfare subject here to have desires or possess goods
I guess the replies will be: 1) if we’re adopt soul theory to get out of this problem for humans, then the door is open to saying that Als are/could be ensouled; 2) if we’re happy to paraphrase in the human case (‘the simples are arranged welfare-subject wise’), we should be happy to do it with AIs; 3) if we’re organicists or something and only accept mereological nihilism about some things, it’s not *super* obvious that no AIs will ever be sufficiently integrated to count as composite objects; 4) even if mereological nihilism is true, we should gamble a potential moral catastrophe on it
Seems ad hoc to introduce a soul without what souls are usually introduced to address (which is consciousness and subjects, whose existence is downstream of the cogito), isn’t the paper supposed to avoid making this move?. Am not an organicist, I think not being one is not crazy, a lot of expert metaphysicians are either universalists or nihilists. m fine with not gamble moral catastrophe I guess, I resist the move here as it usually functions though, introducing an epistemic probability as a lottery we should take, for this wacky schemes you can tell a plausible story on almost any vector of actions; plus false positive risk and all that. Like we could do this with dream people, game people, how certain are you that X is not morally relevant, oh not 0 therefore we should obviously take action Y when there’s other paths that are more robust
Do you have a preferred view about why I am a welfare subject that you don’t think the unconscious AI welfare people can make use of?
I think uAIw people can’t make use of souls, I think you’re a soul, in the sense that people like Dainton and Robert Howell think you are a soul-like thing
Have you read the Cutter paper on AI ensoulment? Would recommend if not!
I have and I don't think it's relevant to this back and forth; moral status in his piece is downstream of the soul grounding experiential capacity
Presumably you think that NLT is such that even higher order evidence from some smart caths believing it or something does not imply going full “plan the whole future as to minimize lies to the cost of any arbitrary good”
Really struggling to see how something without any capacity for consciousness can have any sort of affective state (Mogensen says an affective state, like an emotion, is necessary for desire). He gives an example of unconscious or repressed anger, and analyzes this as a sort of disposition to have an occurrent experience of anger. This is supposed to motivate the view that consciousness is not required for emotion or other affective states. It's clear that a conscious being capable of having an occurrent emotion can have a disposition towards having that occurrent emotion. I don't understand how something without any capacity for consciousness can have a disposition towards having an occurrent experience of an emotion. To my ears, it's like saying a permanently stationary object that lacks the capacity to move can have a disposition to move. I don't have access to his paper so I'm just going by the interview.
Ooh, I'll have to read those papers about unconscious welfare subjects. I have considered the idea before, since I am a desire-satisfactionist, but I haven't gone too in-depth on it. The first time I heard of the idea that non-conscious beings could have moral status, I thought it was ridiculous, but that was at least in part because at the time I thought hedonism was the right account of welfare. I've since then still stuck with, "Only conscious beings have moral status," but I'm not if I should explain this by unconscious beings not really having desires, or their desires not mattering in the same way conscious beings' do, or if I'm actually wrong and they do have moral status.