Seems to me like saying that God is necessary but that this doesn't follow from his perfection represents a massive blow to theism's simplicity and therefore its intrinsic plausibility, for it is no longer the case that all that God is is explicable in terms of this one simple property. And if he's not necessary then it seems like you'd have to reject that contingent reality is explained by a necessary being in order to be a theist, since that would mean that contingent reality is explained by something other than God. But that's a pretty big cost, since there are pretty good reasons for supposing that contingent reality is explained by a necessary existence (as eg Pruss and Rasmussen demonstrate).
It seems then that the argument you're making here is very bad news for your brand of theism. Thoughts?
Maybe one way to resolve this is to just give up on this sort of perfect being theist line, and pick some other simple posit that entails all of God's other attributes plus necessary existence other than perfection. Perhaps you can get this by stipulating that God is simply unlimited being, or something like that. I haven't thought much about how promising those lines are.
Feel like these reasons are saying that necessity would be a sufficient reason for God's greatness (as you say, great-making), but not a necessary one (not a necessary necessity, ha). Which is grand but also seems to mean it doesn't provide much evidence as to whether God, if He exists, would be necessary. In which case ontological argument concerns would remain not that important unless one actually buys the whole argument...
Still nice to consider, Ig I'm just trying to think through the extent of the implications of this consideration
Seems to me like saying that God is necessary but that this doesn't follow from his perfection represents a massive blow to theism's simplicity and therefore its intrinsic plausibility, for it is no longer the case that all that God is is explicable in terms of this one simple property. And if he's not necessary then it seems like you'd have to reject that contingent reality is explained by a necessary being in order to be a theist, since that would mean that contingent reality is explained by something other than God. But that's a pretty big cost, since there are pretty good reasons for supposing that contingent reality is explained by a necessary existence (as eg Pruss and Rasmussen demonstrate).
It seems then that the argument you're making here is very bad news for your brand of theism. Thoughts?
Maybe one way to resolve this is to just give up on this sort of perfect being theist line, and pick some other simple posit that entails all of God's other attributes plus necessary existence other than perfection. Perhaps you can get this by stipulating that God is simply unlimited being, or something like that. I haven't thought much about how promising those lines are.
Feel like these reasons are saying that necessity would be a sufficient reason for God's greatness (as you say, great-making), but not a necessary one (not a necessary necessity, ha). Which is grand but also seems to mean it doesn't provide much evidence as to whether God, if He exists, would be necessary. In which case ontological argument concerns would remain not that important unless one actually buys the whole argument...
Still nice to consider, Ig I'm just trying to think through the extent of the implications of this consideration