On (1), I don't see how God didn't set up hell rather than it's being a natural consequence of distancing one's self from God. God could set up the response to distancing oneself from God's love as one of the following.
a. Go to heaven anyway (perhaps with God manipulating the person's thoughts so that he accepts God's love on God's terms)
b. Hell (whether as CS Lewis describes it - Grey Town - or as traditional horrific hell)
c. Annihilation
d. Great place but worse than heaven (analogy: Club Med)
If God chooses between a through d as the natural consequence of rejecting God's love, then it seems that he is both morally and causally responsible for it as the default position.
On (2), I argue that after enough years (for example, 1 billion), a person who still rejects God's love, doesn't know about his love, or knows about it but doesn't appreciate it's value. In particular, he doesn't know that responding to it on God's terms, makes his, God's, and third parties' lives go better, and (perhaps) makes the the world better. After that many years, the person is no longer responsible for his failure to accept God's love. As a result, God may - and probably should - manipulate him so that he accepts God's love.
Really wish I could’ve heard the answer to my question at 1:23:10 about whether it’s correct to characterize Lewis’ view of hell as a natural consequence that it’s God “setting it up this way.” He was cutting out too bad I almost got none of what he said. If hell is a natural consequence I thought that just meant God *didnt* set it up this way, but that’s just the way it is. Sort of like if a parent tells a child not to touch the stove because it might be hot and the child disobeys and touches it and burns themselves. You wouldn’t call that a punishment from the parent. And the child can’t accuse the parent of “setting it up this way” so I burn when I touch the hot stove. That’s just what happens as a natural consequence of touching the hot stove. Maybe there’s some reason why that analogy wouldn’t work in the case of God. That’s where I thought he might go, but I couldn’t hear the response unfortunately.
As I understood it, the form of his response was a two-parter: 1) it’s hard to see how God wouldn’t be causally responsible for the existence of Hell (on many popular conceptions of Hell as a place/state of being with positive ontological status [to the stove analogy, you might think that if the parent had created everything ex nihilo, they’d be responsible for the presence of the stove]); but 2) even if God isn’t responsible for setting Hell up, there are still good objections to the idea that God wouldn’t rush us out of it (either through persuasion, or, if that failed, the minimum amount of paternalistic coercion necessary.) I think the second point was the more central one.
In the Lewis novel, the various people who are in hell or purgatory (I'm not sure which) don't seem to either know something (for example, the value of art for its own sake or the value of philosophizing) or - perhaps - are weak-willed about giving these things up.
If one thinks that a person is not basically blameworthy for negligence or akrasia, then they are not blameworthy for what's keeping him or her in hell. A person is basically blameworthy for something just in case he's blameworthy for it, but not because he is blameworthy for something else.
Negligence is not a basic blameworthiness maker because you are not blameworthy for what you don't know and don't know that you don't know. Akrasia is not a basic blameworthiness maker because either a person does not know how to will his all-things-considered decision (negligence-based failure) or a desire overpowers his intention and prevents his executing it (similar to compulsion).
Lewis might - and probably would - deny my negligence-akrasia argument. But then it is hard to explain why people do not accept God's love.
Thanks for your thoughts and for attending the talk.
The Catholic church came close to the first argument when they claimed that contraception was worse than abortion because the former prevents souls from being created, while the latter results in more souls residing in heaven. They failed to follow this to its logical conclusion and advocate constant conception and abortion (these days we could do even better with constant rounds of IVF followed by destroying embryos).
This is an interesting point. I didn't know about it.
I also wonder why the pro-lifers - including the church - do not want to charge either the woman or the doctor with murder. If - they think - the fetus is a human being on par with an infant or adult, and the doctor purposely kills it, then - on their account - it would seem to be murder. On this reasoning, the woman would be charged as an accomplice.
The abortion argument is fun, but here is a set of two scenarios:
1. Abortion: 100% chance of fetal heaven, 100% chance of woman (and doctor) going to hell
2. No abortion: 50% chance of hell for all parties
If abortion is a hell-worthy sin, then the fact that it sends fetuses to heaven is not able to justify it.
Regarding preferential treatment for hell-bound patients, this would be called into question by Calvinism, or some kind of doctrine where the inner heart is unknowable (i.e. professing Christians might be faking, atheists might be secret Christians). Maybe God wants us to treat everyone equally, and to do otherwise is to risk hell.
Finally, regarding free speech, maybe God wants us to preach atheism to test the faithful. If we ban free speech, maybe this is allowing "lukewarm" Christians to persist without having their faith challenged. The challenge of faith seems to be an important part of spiritual evolution. God doesn't intend for faith to be easy, but for it to be tested.
I found your audio a bit muffled/quiet Amos, but Dr. Kershnar's was good until minute 12, when it started skipping.
(1) If a mother aborts her fetus and (a) it significantly benefits the fetus and harms no one,
(b) was motivated by (a), and (c) the benefit overrides any right the fetus might have,
then the woman did the right thing for the right reason.
(2) if a person does something that meets (a), (b), and (c) like conditions, then she does not perform a hell-worthy sin.
In fact, God would be unjust were he to punish the woman for doing so given these facts.
On Bioethics
If a Christian knows that heaven and hell exist, and what earns one's trip to heaven, then he can know - albeit fallibly - whether the people close to him are going to heaven. Consider, by analogy, a jury knowing - albeit fallibly - what a defendant intended when he shot someone. To assume we can't know this - merely because a few Christians might be fakers - is implausible.
God would not want us to ignore this fact. He thinks it's good for a patient, his family, friends, and God for a patient to accept his love and join him in heaven. He would not think that a doctor to ignore this important fact about a person's well-being when deciding whether and how to give someone medical treatment.
By analogy, he would not think that a person should ignore a friend's suicidal tendencies when deciding whether to return the friend's gun to him.
The danger of atheistic free speech is that it will turn a person who wholeheartedly believes in and accepts God's love into someone who wholeheartedly does not believe in or rejects God's love. Here, then, is the argument.
(1) Selling AK-47's in Walmart is too dangerous (more specifically, badly fails a cost-benefit analysis).
(2) Allowing atheistic speech is more dangerous than selling AK-47's.
(3) If (1) and (2), then the state should ban atheistic speech.
Dear Hayden and Amos:
These are my responses.
On (1), I don't see how God didn't set up hell rather than it's being a natural consequence of distancing one's self from God. God could set up the response to distancing oneself from God's love as one of the following.
a. Go to heaven anyway (perhaps with God manipulating the person's thoughts so that he accepts God's love on God's terms)
b. Hell (whether as CS Lewis describes it - Grey Town - or as traditional horrific hell)
c. Annihilation
d. Great place but worse than heaven (analogy: Club Med)
If God chooses between a through d as the natural consequence of rejecting God's love, then it seems that he is both morally and causally responsible for it as the default position.
On (2), I argue that after enough years (for example, 1 billion), a person who still rejects God's love, doesn't know about his love, or knows about it but doesn't appreciate it's value. In particular, he doesn't know that responding to it on God's terms, makes his, God's, and third parties' lives go better, and (perhaps) makes the the world better. After that many years, the person is no longer responsible for his failure to accept God's love. As a result, God may - and probably should - manipulate him so that he accepts God's love.
Best,
Steve K
Really wish I could’ve heard the answer to my question at 1:23:10 about whether it’s correct to characterize Lewis’ view of hell as a natural consequence that it’s God “setting it up this way.” He was cutting out too bad I almost got none of what he said. If hell is a natural consequence I thought that just meant God *didnt* set it up this way, but that’s just the way it is. Sort of like if a parent tells a child not to touch the stove because it might be hot and the child disobeys and touches it and burns themselves. You wouldn’t call that a punishment from the parent. And the child can’t accuse the parent of “setting it up this way” so I burn when I touch the hot stove. That’s just what happens as a natural consequence of touching the hot stove. Maybe there’s some reason why that analogy wouldn’t work in the case of God. That’s where I thought he might go, but I couldn’t hear the response unfortunately.
As I understood it, the form of his response was a two-parter: 1) it’s hard to see how God wouldn’t be causally responsible for the existence of Hell (on many popular conceptions of Hell as a place/state of being with positive ontological status [to the stove analogy, you might think that if the parent had created everything ex nihilo, they’d be responsible for the presence of the stove]); but 2) even if God isn’t responsible for setting Hell up, there are still good objections to the idea that God wouldn’t rush us out of it (either through persuasion, or, if that failed, the minimum amount of paternalistic coercion necessary.) I think the second point was the more central one.
Thanks Amos! Yeah I’m not too sure about that first response, but the second response seems right to me
Dear Hayden and Amos:
In the Lewis novel, the various people who are in hell or purgatory (I'm not sure which) don't seem to either know something (for example, the value of art for its own sake or the value of philosophizing) or - perhaps - are weak-willed about giving these things up.
If one thinks that a person is not basically blameworthy for negligence or akrasia, then they are not blameworthy for what's keeping him or her in hell. A person is basically blameworthy for something just in case he's blameworthy for it, but not because he is blameworthy for something else.
Negligence is not a basic blameworthiness maker because you are not blameworthy for what you don't know and don't know that you don't know. Akrasia is not a basic blameworthiness maker because either a person does not know how to will his all-things-considered decision (negligence-based failure) or a desire overpowers his intention and prevents his executing it (similar to compulsion).
Lewis might - and probably would - deny my negligence-akrasia argument. But then it is hard to explain why people do not accept God's love.
Thanks for your thoughts and for attending the talk.
Apologies for the audio problems.
Best,
Steve K
Sounds good! Thanks for the reply Dr. Kershnar, I very much enjoyed the interview!
The Catholic church came close to the first argument when they claimed that contraception was worse than abortion because the former prevents souls from being created, while the latter results in more souls residing in heaven. They failed to follow this to its logical conclusion and advocate constant conception and abortion (these days we could do even better with constant rounds of IVF followed by destroying embryos).
See Archbishop Hayes' Christmas address in 1921: https://web.archive.org/web/20110720012829/http://www.cfnews.org/Hayes-Christmas.htm
This is an interesting point. I didn't know about it.
I also wonder why the pro-lifers - including the church - do not want to charge either the woman or the doctor with murder. If - they think - the fetus is a human being on par with an infant or adult, and the doctor purposely kills it, then - on their account - it would seem to be murder. On this reasoning, the woman would be charged as an accomplice.
enjoyed the discussion,sure most of it went over the head,but enjoyable!
The abortion argument is fun, but here is a set of two scenarios:
1. Abortion: 100% chance of fetal heaven, 100% chance of woman (and doctor) going to hell
2. No abortion: 50% chance of hell for all parties
If abortion is a hell-worthy sin, then the fact that it sends fetuses to heaven is not able to justify it.
Regarding preferential treatment for hell-bound patients, this would be called into question by Calvinism, or some kind of doctrine where the inner heart is unknowable (i.e. professing Christians might be faking, atheists might be secret Christians). Maybe God wants us to treat everyone equally, and to do otherwise is to risk hell.
Finally, regarding free speech, maybe God wants us to preach atheism to test the faithful. If we ban free speech, maybe this is allowing "lukewarm" Christians to persist without having their faith challenged. The challenge of faith seems to be an important part of spiritual evolution. God doesn't intend for faith to be easy, but for it to be tested.
I found your audio a bit muffled/quiet Amos, but Dr. Kershnar's was good until minute 12, when it started skipping.
Dear DeepLeftAnalysis:
Thank you for your thoughts. I appreciate them.
On Abortion
(1) If a mother aborts her fetus and (a) it significantly benefits the fetus and harms no one,
(b) was motivated by (a), and (c) the benefit overrides any right the fetus might have,
then the woman did the right thing for the right reason.
(2) if a person does something that meets (a), (b), and (c) like conditions, then she does not perform a hell-worthy sin.
In fact, God would be unjust were he to punish the woman for doing so given these facts.
On Bioethics
If a Christian knows that heaven and hell exist, and what earns one's trip to heaven, then he can know - albeit fallibly - whether the people close to him are going to heaven. Consider, by analogy, a jury knowing - albeit fallibly - what a defendant intended when he shot someone. To assume we can't know this - merely because a few Christians might be fakers - is implausible.
God would not want us to ignore this fact. He thinks it's good for a patient, his family, friends, and God for a patient to accept his love and join him in heaven. He would not think that a doctor to ignore this important fact about a person's well-being when deciding whether and how to give someone medical treatment.
By analogy, he would not think that a person should ignore a friend's suicidal tendencies when deciding whether to return the friend's gun to him.
On Free Speech
The danger of atheistic free speech is that it will turn a person who wholeheartedly believes in and accepts God's love into someone who wholeheartedly does not believe in or rejects God's love. Here, then, is the argument.
(1) Selling AK-47's in Walmart is too dangerous (more specifically, badly fails a cost-benefit analysis).
(2) Allowing atheistic speech is more dangerous than selling AK-47's.
(3) If (1) and (2), then the state should ban atheistic speech.
Thanks again for the great comments,
Steve K